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NOTES AND ABSTRACTS.

CONDUCTED BY J. D. FORREST, A. T. FREEMAN, AND H. A. MILLIS.

Sociology as an Introduction to Law.—The reconciliation between the law and sociology is an accomplished fact. It is no less efficacious for having been slow and difficult, and the reciprocal use which the moral and juridical sciences, on the one hand, and the social sciences, on the other, make of one another permits a still more intimate union to be foreseen in the near future. This union will consist necessarily in a synthetic unity of their principles and a rational classification of corresponding phenomena. It will then be found that the philosophy of law will bring its data in abundance to social psychology, and the general theory of the state will constitute but an integral chapter of sociology.

These provisions perhaps appear premature. Can a science as ancient, as complete as that of the law, depend upon another science not yet formed, without precise laws, without determined classification?

We judge it superfluous to insist on the averred fact that law does not constitute the principle of social life, but one of its phenomena. But then "it is evident," as H. Spencer observes, "that a more special science cannot be perfectly comprehended as long as the more general science which includes it is not." Their coöperation is imposed then at the first onset. It is far from being premature, since the material furnished little by little by one side or the other is in waiting but too long. And it is to be noted that it is not alone sociology that attacks questions of law; juridical theory also daily meets problems insoluble in its own domain. Their case pending hinders progress and constitutes a permanent obstacle to generalizations more broad, and therefore more fruitful.

Let us cite some examples at random of investigations which are discussed helplessly in the absence of premises capable of embracing the problems in their whole extent.

(a) The principle of nationalities has already forced the door of public and of international law. Formulated thus by Bluntschli: "Every nation is called upon to form a state, every state ought to be a national person," it proclaims as the subject of law a social individuality whose determination pertains entirely to sociology. The consequences are grave in every case; they hold in suspense the question even of the subjects of international law. Who are they? Juridical persons, collectivities individualized by acts of positive law, or living organisms, natural persons, collective individualities, able to invoke their innate rights after simple legal proof? In this latter case there is put a question of state and capacity, a previous question of fact, the necessary criterion of which can be furnished only by a detailed sociological theory.

(b) A controversy forty years old has been abandoned by jurisprudence because of the lack of bases large enough to permit the problem to be faced in its entirety. The question was put by Robert von Mohl: Does a social law (*Gesellschaftsrecht*) exist distinct from public and private law? It was generally (Treitschke, van Krieken, Bluntschli, etc.) answered in the negative. But then how was the canonical law to be classed, which formerly rivaled civil legislation, and, above all, the statutes and rules of powerful associations not recognized by the state, which often make themselves obeyed more easily than the legal authorities? Then, too, what place was to be assigned to juridical science, that collective work, the incontestable source of positive law, and to custom, which is often maintained along side of, indeed even in opposition to, obligatory standards? There are thus many social phenomena which await distribution by a theory more positive than that of natural law, and more synthetic than that of positive law.

(c) In public law the will of the state, of the legislator, of the governmental power, etc., is constantly spoken of. Yet modern psychology refuses to volitional

facts an existence independent of intellectual and affective states. It applauds their reduction to the one and the other, sometimes to the former exclusively. However it may be, the philosophy of law cannot make abstraction from this, and in admitting a social will it is obliged to turn toward collective thought and sentiments to do the work of social psychology.

(d) Again, let us cite the relations of law with morality. Excepting general observations more or less vague, and the indication of very manifest points of contact, such as in the analysis of notions of justice, of responsibility, and of duty, we find in literature no solution so little precise and satisfactory. Nevertheless, "the juridical order is always not only united, but subordinated to the moral order;" there are two faces or two questions to solve with reference to every phenomenon. It is, at the same time, social and psychic, and it can be elucidated only on this common ground.

As sociology, on one side, can exert a salutary influence on the consolidation of the first principles of the law, the juridical sciences, on the other side, are called to a no less fruitful reciprocity. Sociological studies are often reproached, and not without reason, because their lack of precision, the vagueness of their terminology, constitute too loose a method. The justifiable search for a fixed basis, for a character of scientific exactitude, has led some of the most powerful minds to give sociology a shape frankly biological. These attempts have formed only the scaffolding, useful for raising a coherent body of sociological inductions. The body remains, but the scaffolding, formed of more or less arbitrary analogies, can be considered as definitely demolished; and with it have fallen the appearances of precision, in great part factitious. Here is the point on which the science of law can lend its assistance, thanks to the spirit of vigorous classification which belongs to it, in the precise definition of notions, and in a notable contingent of already systematized facts which it has embraced. Does it not constitute itself the most important client to social science?

But are not two domains and two different sciences confounded here? Yes, if we wish to make sociology conform to the point of view of law, a frequent error among theoretic jurists, or if we wish to make law conform to the point of view of sociology, a mistake often made by practical sociologists, or, in other words, if we try to drive one science into another, and thus effect a reduction of that which is irreducible. There will be no confusion if we seek in the entire domain of social phenomena the unity of the fundamental laws in order to effect, in the light of these superior abstractions, a rational classification of the particular domains and a definitive systematization of material so complicated. A conciliation attempted in a spirit of synthesis is fortified against confusion, provided that it is followed by a comprehensive analysis.

The connection of the sciences constitutes the basis of all philosophy, facilitates considerably the theoretic consolidation of particular branches, and always makes fertile the field of investigations. Thus, Descartes created analytic geometry by the collaboration of geometry and algebra; Comte foresaw the important results which the correlation of physiology and chemistry would give. Combination of the latter with physics is now the order of the day. Modern sociology has greatly advanced in relying on a biological basis. Finally, the affinity between physiology and psychology has given rise to a new branch of the latter, physiological psychology. In this latter case there is more than a simple analogy with the relation of sociology and the science of law.

Jurisprudence, that is, the art of making, interpreting, and applying the laws, is sufficient for itself, but the philosophy of law, which is called upon to clarify with its lights, suffers from its isolation. In attaching it to general philosophy, as the German school has done, it is suspended as it were in an unstable equilibrium, instead of being furnished with a support. It is only by the medium of the social life that law can be attached to a general philosophy, disengaged definitely from all speculative character belonging to abstract ideology.

The general theory of law may have two points of departure. Either it takes as a basis the faculties of the individual, his reason or his will, in order to deduce the principles of justice, of liberty, of rights and duties; or it finds in society the only source of every juridical relation, and consequently of every notion of law. Attempts of the first category have succeeded more or less in constructing systems of private

law, but they have completely failed in the domain of public law. In vain has it been attempted to widen the basis, to substitute human nature for the individual reason. It has only resulted in the theory of the state of nature and of the social contract, constructed *a priori*, fanciful and contradicted by the facts.

The place assigned to public law in relation to civil law is what characterizes the two points of departure. If the first determines the second, the institutes of private law depend upon the social and political organization. In the opposite case the contrary would be true.

The general theory of law still seeks its premises. It will find them in sociology more synthetic and more systematic than it is at present.

One of its branches, which concerns us more particularly, since it constitutes the object of the present study, having given rise to many misunderstandings on the subject of its classification, deserves special examination. We speak of the general theory of the state. Strictly it does not constitute a branch of the science of law, and its frequent confusion with public law merits removal. Thus even Bluntschli considers his work, entitled *Allgemeine Staatslehre*, as a general treatise on the state in its entirety, and in the double point of view of law and of politics, without distinguishing the two aspects of the conception. G. Waitz applies the term politics to the science of the state. We shall have occasion again to return to this point, and to the stricter delimitation of these three domains. Lorenz Stein is more precise:

"There is no system of public law in itself. It exists rather as that which we intend by it; it is the system of the organic life of the state itself. Public law constitutes the juridical expression of this system. Public law is the order, conceived and determined as right, of the organs and of their public activity, so far as these latter form the unity of the state."

We thus have on one side a particular system of organic social life, unified in the state, a system which constitutes the object of its *general theory*, on the other the juridical expression of this life, the object of *public law*. But what do we mean by the "juridical expression" of any social organization, in the double point of view of sociology and of the philosophy of law, which we claim to be the same? It is its psychic life or, more exactly, its intellectual life. Public law is nothing but a particular sphere of the social thought, of the intellectual functions of the political organization, a sphere, the physical antecedents of which constitute the functional life of the state.

It is important for us here to determine the relation between the general theory of the state and public law. In our opinion it is the same as between the study of physico-organic facts and that of psychic facts. The physical and the psychic can be brought back to a superior phenomenal unity only in the light of a general philosophy, and ought to be considered in their reciprocal relations as irreducible one to the other. The case is the same with the two sciences mentioned, the general theory of the state and public law. Their domain and their nature are different and distinct, and all confusion, all mutual encroachment would be absolutely contrary to the philosophical spirit.

Sociology classifies and explains facts by discovering their general laws; the particular social sciences set them forth by constituting simply branches of the former. In this sense the general theory of the state is only one of the great chapters of sociology. This does not hinder, from the point of view of the complete comprehension of the phenomena, sociology from being intimately connected with the theory of law, the philosophy of which ought to constitute another great chapter of this same synthesizing science. Thus the place reserved for the study of the state in the totality of juridical instruction is plainly justified. Perhaps with time this particular branch will be supplanted by a general theory of social phenomena, by sociology. The progress realized in our time by this science shows us that in the near future it will be considered as a necessary introduction to the study of law (Fernand Faure, "La Sociologie dans les facultés de droit en France," *Revue Intern. de Sociologie*, 1893, II. René Worms, "La Sociologie et le droit," *ibid.*, 1895, I. Maurice Haurion, "Les facultés de droit et la Sociologie," *Revue générale de droit*, t. XVII).—SIGISMOND BALICKI, *Thèse: L'Etat comme Organisation Exercitive de la Société Politique*, Paris, 1896, Introduction. Fr.

The Psychology of Social Progress.—Between psychology and sociology there is no line to be drawn. The latter science is based upon psychological analysis. In considering psychological conceptions we are considering the bases of sociological science, and those conceptions themselves can only be really understood in connection with social relations. Man is distinguished from the lower animals by his capacity for progressive wants. This capacity for always discovering new wants is a necessary condition of human progress. What is the psychological explanation for the exceptional cases of people who are absolutely free from the stimulus of progressive desires? The stream of consciousness in the individual life is a current always directed towards some end. Man, having no sufficient instincts for the purpose, must achieve his ends by way of consciously devised means. Any object of striving having once been an end in the subordinate sense of being a means is henceforward capable of becoming an end in the principal sense. Any one of the steps may achieve an independent interest and become desired for itself. What instinct does for the lower animals habit tends to do for man. In proportion as the means by which ends are reached become easy and familiar it tends to become habitual and unconscious. There is immense gain if, *after* we have developed higher interests, we can relegate lower ones to automatic action. But the danger is that the mind should never have broken through the primitive cycle, or should have been allowed to become automatic at a low level. Mental struggle, then, is the first law of progress. If any individual or class is cut off from this struggle they are cut off from the possibility of developing higher interests. Every new perception alters the whole group of ideas into which it is received. This has for result: (1) that nothing of a totally new nature *can* be received into the mind; and (2) what the mind sees depends upon what it already is. This seems to tend against the possibility of any state of society in which the individuals shall have the same views, interests, and mental experiences. Yet we do have similar views. This is due mainly to two facts: (a) that certain fundamental characteristics of affection and gregariousness form a common basis upon which all individual life is erected; (b) that we are rational beings, and therefore share in a common mental organization which is reflected into our social organization. All purposive, rational thought and action is guided by noetic synthesis; all automatic action by association alone. The higher the type of mind the more complex and complete will be its organization according to interests and purposes. A system of rewards and punishments, therefore, will develop only a quite commonplace type of character. Some *interest* and *purpose* must be introduced to develop character. We no longer need to teach self-abnegation, but the enlarging of the self, the finding it in wider interests. At this point psychology merges into sociology. What is needed in social as in individual life is the introduction of organizing and not disintegrating ideas.—HELEN BOSANQUET, *International Journal of Ethics*, April 1897. Fr.

The Evolution of Domestic Service.—In antiquity servants were slaves; in the Middle Ages, serfs. Servitude, though contrary to human dignity, had great advantages over the present condition, since it assured food and lodging in sickness and old age. Now servants, unable to count on gratitude from those they serve, judge that faithfulness and patience are folly. They are further degraded by being required to renounce their individuality. A model servant must be an admirable machine, working noiselessly and impassively at a sign. The servants' position is precarious, but isolation has prevented their union. No law of importance protects domestics. Some charitable associations place and supervise maids, but a trade union should take the place of such narrow though sincere efforts. In England this social work has begun. A league of women's trades unions, founded in 1874, tries to group women workers who cannot enter men's unions. There is also a syndicate of domestic servants which publishes the *Domestic Servants' Gazette*. Its objects are to protect servants' certificates against unjust masters, to limit hours of work, especially for servants under eighteen, to make employers responsible for accidents not caused by negligence, to found employment offices and servants' homes. What will be the results of such unions? Servants will develop a new sense of their dignity and rights. They will cease to be servants,

and will become employ  s with clearly defined hours and duties. Servants will learn their business like other workers. The common complaints against servants are often well founded, but good work cannot be expected from untaught workers nor good feeling from those whose future is uncertain, and whose present means exhausting labor, lack of freedom, the worst room in the house, loneliness and lack of innocent pleasures. A servant in Russia is worse off than when he was a slave; in Austria, little better. In Germany the position is less humiliating, but pay very low. In cities of France servants are in revolt, but in a helpless way, that leads to nothing but perpetual change of mistresses. In England they have won some privileges. In the United States wages are high, and, with no board to pay, there is every advantage in taking service. Nevertheless few do, except immigrants, who have not had time to develop a spirit of independence. A young woman prefers freedom and superior social position to material advantages. She dreads the loneliness of the country or of a house where she is the only servant. Miss Jane Addams, of Chicago, attributes to the cutting off from their own family life the refusal of the better class of workers to enter service. She foresees the formation of clubs to furnish social life, the ending of regular hours at seven P. M., later service to have extra pay, and the lessening of work done within the home. Mrs. Stuckert, of Illinois, proposes many homes grouped about a common central building, in which washing and cooking shall be done for all, which shall lodge the servants, and contain library, reading rooms, assembly hall, kindergartens, and dining hall. A family may have its meals sent to its own house. This plan does not interfere with family life; at the same time it secures expert service under conditions pleasant for the servants.—HUDRY-MENOS, *La Revue Socialiste*, May 1897. Fr.

The Social Question in the East.—Economic and social conditions are the real cause of the Eastern question. The Ottoman Empire is inhabited by many petty peoples, differing in origin, dialects, customs, religion, held together by political bonds and even by their mutual hatred of which their ruler takes advantage. The economic situation is precarious. A rude agriculture and the raising of animals are almost the only forms of labor. Manufacture scarcely exists. Imports pay a duty of 8 or 10 per cent. There is a tax on salt, on fish, on animals killed at the abattoirs, etc. All agricultural products, except potatoes, are taxed 10 per cent. As the collection of this tax is farmed out 30 or even 50 per cent. is often seized instead of the nominal 10 per cent. The peasant pays many other taxes. Christians pay a tax in lieu of military service, as Mussulmans will not serve with them; besides the government does not wish Christians to be familiar with arms. The tax on domestic animals is 18 cents a head, while a sheep or goat in Asia Minor may be bought for 12 cents. There is a tax on the laborer's hut and on his bit of land. The tax on crops is the only one collected regularly. The others are allowed to accumulate till some public event when money is needed, then all arrears are called for at once. The peasant must then go to the usurers or to the large landholders, who furnish him money at high rates, taking a mortgage on his land. To obtain seed and the use of farming implements his crops are mortgaged in advance. He is never able to pay the interest, and his land is seized. Thus the land, not the property of sultan or church, is largely coming into the hands of a few officials. Those dispossessed of land are moving to the centers of population, forming a vast proletariat. Lack of transportation brings famine in case of a poor harvest. Corruption in government, and a more picturesque brigandage among the mountains help to depopulate whole sections. Almost all industries are disappearing under competition with Austro-Hungary and Germany. Mining is almost the only modern industry. There are rich mines of copper, chrome, manganese, borax, and coal. The work is nearly all done by women and young girls. The workers sleep in the open air, the masters providing nothing but two dirty mats for each person. The day's work is thirteen hours. The pay ranges from 10 to 20 cents. Only the overseers, who are men, receive the latter sum. The proletariat is as yet helpless because ignorant, unorganized, divided by religion and race hatred. No reforms will remedy the ill. There must be a complete change of social r  gime.—HUGUES ROSALT in *Revue Socialiste*, November 1896. Fr.

Market Wrecking.—During the years 1895-6-7 the world's production of wheat has been considerably below the consumption for the same period. Yet the price of wheat has been steadily falling. This anomalous state of affairs can only be accounted for by the success of the trickery of market wreckers. Under the old system of trading the bare possibility of a deficiency would have sent the price up to a high rate. Wheat for nominal delivery in June is being sold in New York at nine cents a bushel. This is fictitious wheat sold without intention to deliver actual grain. Yet the fictitious price regulates the price at which real grain is sold. The markets of the United States are being wrecked for the benefit of gamblers. Essentially, an option is a bet upon the price of a certain commodity at a given date. This gambling system completely rules the markets of the civilized world. The option sales in a year in the American wheat markets amount to ten times the total quantity of wheat grown in the United States. The results of the system are: (1) Profuse offerings of fictitious wheat have a lowering effect upon market prices; (2) the maintenance of the option system involves the active operation of men who are professional market wreckers, who gain more by a fall than by a rise in prices; (3) the "bears" have a more powerful influence upon market prices than the "bulls;" (4) the fixing of low prices for distant months reduces the prices of spot wheat and tends to stereotype the prices of distant months at low rates; (5) the gambling and trickery of professional "bears" and "bulls," and their frequent defalcations create a constant feeling of insecurity among capitalists, and thus exercise a generally depressing effect upon the markets. This growing system is thus a gross wrong to producers of wheat and some other commodities. The objections to anti-option legislation are no more valid than to the existing law against the sale of bank shares not in actual possession. No one should be allowed to sell produce which he does not possess, or will not obtain and deliver. The anti-option bill which failed in effect proposed this.—WILLIAM E. BEAR, *Fortnightly Review*, April 1897. Fr.

The Genesis of the Ethical Self.—The child's thought of self is at any time a self of habit or a self of accommodation. But the only adequate expression of him is that which acquaints us with the self of all the rich social relationships, or the "socius." The question of the further development of the sense of self, based on the conflicts of the two earlier partial selves, is really one of vital social meaning, and that, too, in the ethical sense. Historical doctrines of the rise of the ethical sense are of two classes: those basing the ethical sentiments on sympathy, and those basing them on custom or habit. They represent constructions based on the partial selves—the "accommodating" and the "habitual." The child begins to be aware in his contact with others of such a presence as the socius. By his actions through obedience he learns that there is something always present, a circle of common interest, a family propriety, a mass of accepted tradition. As he understands the meaning of obedience better, the socius becomes more and more intimate as a law-abiding self of his own. It becomes the germ of the ideals of life. (1) The ethical self is a slow attainment of the child. The developed ethical sense needs less and less to appeal to an *alter* self, an authority. (2) As the socius in the mind of the child expands, there is the constant tendency to make it real in some concrete form in the social group. (3) The law, which this self embodies, is in one sense always the realized self of somebody. But further, the law is a function of the socius—consciousness in each of its two aspects—"projective" and "ejective." (4) The social attitude in favor of law becomes to a degree habit, but a habit of *acting*, not a habit of *action*. It is frequently a habit of violating habits.—J. MARK BALDWIN, *Philosophical Review*, May 1897. Fr.

The Grievance of the West.—During his campaign work in Ohio and Indiana last fall, Professor Hyslop found that when he told farmers that "free silver" would lower salaries and wages, they said that was just what they wanted. Upon investigating the conditions he found that while prices of farm products had fallen, money wages had remained stationary. The farmers could not afford to pay high wages, and as a rule laborers would not work for less than they had been receiving. The cause of this astonishing fact Mr. Hyslop finds in the system of out-door relief,

a "system of poor-relief as bad as any that existed in the worst days of charity in Europe." He states that "this relief, coupled with the philanthropic tendencies of the community, will secure relief equal to the standard of living," and that while assurance of this relief exists, the laborer "is not likely to work unless his wages give him a profit over the standard of living," unless he gets more for his work than poor-law relief will give him."

But not only does this system of relief keep up wages, it also worse than needlessly burdens the farmer with taxes. The heavy taxes also tend to destroy the value of his land. While this problem of out-door relief is not the only problem, it is one of the most important problems affecting the western farmer, and, while its solution will not solve all his problems, it will afford him great relief. The "remedy" is to abolish absolutely all out-door relief."—JAMES, H. HYSLOP, in *Forum*, June 1897. M.

The Pauper Problem in America.—"Our social structure is ablaze with pauperism." If asked the cause of this, "I should say that it is the natural, logical, and philosophical outcome of the unwise handling of the problem of the poor by a policy which, in seeking to obliterate the disease, has only driven it into the vitals of society, thereby aggravating the evil and endangering the very existence of the body politic." "... nine-tenths of the present strained relations between the classes and the masses . . . are due to the unwise and unphilosophical handling of the problem."

But while this is true, it is also true that the *origin* of the evil is in the depopulation of the country districts. The "natural and self-evident" remedy "is a restoration of the balance of population from the city to the country." This is practicable and sufficient. The Salvation Army scheme for accomplishing this includes: (1) large western settlements, (2) farm colonies, (3) Pingree "potato patches," and (4) city colonies with cheap shelters, temporary workyards, labor bureaus, and homes for the fallen.—F. DE LATOUR BOOTH-TUCKER, in *Charities Review*, April 1897. M.

Municipal Conditions in California.—A new charter is being pressed for San Francisco. The city has suffered from divided powers and responsibility. Recently the legislature has given the veto power to the mayor, to be overcome only by a three-fourths vote of the council. The early indifference to the city government which is gradually giving place to a sense of civic pride, has produced two curious results: (1) The city has created no public debt and is without bonds, an experience not paralleled by any city of equal size, importance, and rapid growth. (2) The same short-sighted thrift has prevented the city from owning any public utilities, all of which are owned by private corporations. The result has been the creation of powerful monopolies, the imposition of high rates, and suspected corruption of public bodies, all of which practically amounts to the imposition by private companies of a higher taxation of citizens than that of the city itself.—HON. JAMES D. PHELAN, *Arena*, June 1897. Fr.

Arrangement of Organized Charities.—The two principal objections to charity organizations are: (1) as to their methods. Organized charity has almost become a fad. Indiscriminate giving is generally discouraged by students of the subject. The mode of labor or partial payment is only an evasion and exerts the same degrading influence on the standard of living as does indiscriminate giving, besides instituting unfair competition with legitimate business enterprises. It is the systematic and permanent character of organized charity that makes it the most dangerous form of relief distribution. (2) Charity organizations by enlisting the sympathy and contributions of the rich toward charity relief divert their attention from the means of poverty-prevention by social improvements. The evils of poverty arise from our social conditions. The remedy cannot be found in any system of private charity, but in some means of making the care of the dislocated an involuntary and inseparable part of the productive system itself—by some system of industrial insurance.—*Gunton's Magazine*, June 1897. Fr.

A Defense of Organized Charities.—The only assumption of organized charity workers is the recognition of the patent fact of actual suffering. They have no disposition to retard social reform. Organized charity deals with the causes of poverty and has a splendid record in making dependents self-supporting. It recognizes not only the social, but the personal causes of poverty. The mistaken methods of almsgiving criticised are the *raison d'être* of organized charities. The charge of bad methods of charity organizations should not be laid against organized charity as such. Organized charity, instead of taking the soul out of charity, puts a soul into it through the sympathetic study and personal attention given to every case.—FREDERICK WILLIAM HAMILTON, *Gulton's Magazine*, April 1897. Fr.

The Development of American Cities.—Our municipal government is in theory more democratic than that of Europe. But when results are compared we find that the European cities do far more than ours for "the people," so that we have much to learn from them.

Good government is largely a question of good administration. This can be had in a large city only by intrusting to some one man the full power of executive direction. Civil service must be vigorously applied.

Municipal functions are of three kinds: (1) Those of primal necessity, such as police and fire protection (2) others now looked upon as necessary, such as food inspection, and the regulation of the liquor traffic; and (3) those affording opportunities for higher education, recreation, and comfort, as libraries, parks, play grounds, and public baths. In this third class, although our conception of the functions of government is widening, we have much to learn. Our cities should do everything promotive of the well-being of the people.—JOSIAH QUINCY, Mayor of Boston, in *Arena*, March, 1897. M.

Democratic Tendencies.—Democracy is an old idea, but is now working under new conditions. There were democracies in Greece. But there ability was recognized. Here the dogma of equality instead of meaning equality of political rights and burdens has gone farther and belittled "special ability" and "capacity." Then, too, the functions of government, just as our whole life, have broadened, demanding an ever more complex machinery and more highly skilled administration. While we have recognized "fitness" in some of our minor offices, our larger ones have become political "spoils," and as a result we have really less, instead of greater, ability to correspond to the greater needs. That we are not securing increased "intellectual equipment" corresponding to the greater need for it is our most serious problem.—E. L. GODKIN in the *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1897. M.

The Problem of Municipal Government.—"Municipal government is doing certain lines of work for a city for the least sum of expense. . . . Contracts are the center and almost the entire circumference of municipal government," and therefore "furnish the chief municipal problem." It is impossible to find any one thing which will solve the problem for all time. Minimizing the number of contracts by an extension of municipal ownership and of the "day wages" system can do much. The most effective way of then dealing with contracts is to refer them to the people by means of the *referendum*.—HAZEN S. PINGREE in *Arena*, April, 1897. M.